Using personnel records from a single firm, we analyze the kind of formal salary system used by most large firms. The system is highly centralized, covering salary levels, ranges, raises, and bonuses. Supervisors have little discretion over pay other than through subjective performance ratings. The firm holds relatively strictly to the salary rules, leading to observable constraints on pay for employees near the top of the salary range. However, there is little evidence that the firm suffers important costs from these constraints. We also examine whether this firm's practices are consistent with prior theoretical and empirical research on internal labor markets.
Introduction
A fundamental debate in the literature on internal labor markets is whether personnel policies have real effects, or are just a veil through which the pressures of the external labor market act relatively unimpeded. Most firms make extensive use of formal rules for personnel administration. These rules and policies seem highly bureaucratic (Adams 1997) . Doeringer and Piore (1971) argued that "administrative rules and customs"-personnel policies-shield workers from the external market, thus introducing the idea of an internal labor market. Macroeconomists often assume that compensation, turnover, and job mobility are somewhat unresponsive to current economic conditions. In contrast, most work in labor economics has ignored firm personnel policies (possibly because of the type of data traditionally available for study).
In the past decade or so, however, a growing body of theoretical work has examined the design and effects of firm personnel policies. Empirical studies looking at internal labor markets have uncovered a number of stylized facts. In turn, new models have been developed that can account for many of the stylized facts. Findings that are difficult to reconcile with classical or more modern models are usually supposed to be caused by administrative rules and customs. Yet the link between such findings and specific firm policies has not been made.
In this paper we study five years of personnel records from a single firm. The data include information on the formal salary policies that have been unavailable in prior datasets. One goal of the paper is to analyze these policies. They are similar to those used by many firms, and described in and advocated by compensation and human resource textbooks. The firm uses centralized policies to set salary levels and ranges, and to determine how performance ratings are used to award raises and bonuses. We consider whether these policies can help explain findings that prior studies attributed to administrative rules. A second goal of the paper is to add to the small but growing literature studying firm personnel records. These studies use data collected in different ways, from different firms, and often measure different variables. This makes it difficult to piece together from the various studies an empirical model of how firms administer their internal labor markets, and with what effects. While analyzing the firm's compensation system we provide as much evidence related to the prior empirical literature as is feasible.
Our results confirm findings from previous empirical studies for a large number of empirical questions that are important in motivating recent theories in this literature. We find little evidence that constraints from formal pay policies impose substantial costs in the form of lower incentives or higher turnover. However, there is some evidence that in some (perhaps smaller) ways, the salary system shields employees from the external labor market. Because of this, it is possible that formal salary rules such as those examined here may be one explanation for some unexplained findings from prior work (such as the effect of entry cohort on wages). Medoff & Abraham (e.g., 1980 ) conducted the first influential analyses using firm-level data; they focused on the relationships among performance evaluations, experience, and earnings. The most extensive documentation of an internal labor market is Baker, Gibbs & Holmstrom (1994a,b) [hereafter BGH], focusing on career and wage dynamics. Most studies since have, to varying degrees, explored whether these findings held for other firms in other contexts (see, e.g., single-firm studies by Lazear 1992; Gibbs 1995 Gibbs , 2002 Seltzer & Merrett 2000; Dohmen, Kriechel & Pfann 2001; Treble, von Gameren & Bridges 2001; Kwon 2001; Dohmen 2003b; Lin 2003 ; and a study of 220 firms by Eriksson & Werwatz 2003) . Because of the scarcity of within-firm datasets, and inconsistent data collection and variable definitions, it can be difficult to compare findings across datasets. For this reason, Gibbons (1997) argues that, "It would be a great service if empirical researchers would provide evidence on a core set of questions before studying specific issues of their own." He then lists ten core questions, reproduced in Table 1 and referred to throughout the paper as Q 1 through Q 10 . In the table, we summarize whether or not available evidence is consistent with the stylized facts on these questions from Medoff & Abraham and BGH. 1 We provide evidence on these questions (the last column of Table 1). Since we have different variables than in other studies, sometimes we answer variants (e.g., focusing on location in salary range rather than deciles in job level). Similarly, we are better able to focus on cross-sectional questions, since we have a short panel.
Background
BGH compared their findings to several base models, and concluded that their evidence was inconsistent with simple models of learning or incentives. Instead they suggested that many of their findings were consistent with a model in which employees accumulate human capital at varying rates. However, they also argued that some of their findings seemed inconsistent with standard theoretical tools, and might be caused by "administrative rules and procedures." For example, there was clear evidence of downward nominal wage rigidity, which is difficult to explain theoretically. They also found a "Green Card effect," or regression to the middle in pay among those in the same job level. 2 They also found a cohort effect, whereby the entry cohort of an employee was a significant predictor of earnings years later. This suggests that raises of different cohorts are correlated, which might be the case if raises are administered centrally.
1 Also see Hamilton & MacKinnon (2001) . They do not focus on the questions listed in Table 1 , but analyze related internal labor markets questions, using personnel records from a Canadian railroad around World War II.
2 BGH coined this term because supervisors were given a green card with a matrix of percentage raise ranges as a function of location in range and performance rating. The raise percentages in the typical "green card" have the effect of regression of salary to the middle of the range, by giving smaller raises to workers in the high range of the pay scale, and larger raises to workers at the low end, for any given performance rating. Similar policies that lead to wage compression are seen in many firms with and without formal calculation of raises as a function of location in range and performance rating. In this paper, we use the term Green Card to refer to these effects, although other forces could generate them.
Subsequent theoretical work (e.g., Bernhardt 1995; Gibbons & Waldman 1999 Kwon 2001; Golan 2002; Dohmen 2003a) has achieved substantial success in explaining many of these findings using integrative models based on standard tools. However, it remains unsettled whether or not administrative rules and procedures play some role as well. Administrative rules and procedures may simply ratify or mirror underlying wage and promotion dynamics, or, it may be that they play an additional role, constraining the firm's personnel management in ways that affect careers, turnover, or wages beyond labor market factors. This is a difficult issue to sort out, but in this paper we attempt to make progress in evaluating this fundamental question.
To this end, our first step is to describe pay policies in more detail than has been available before. Our second step is to look for evidence on whether or not the policies drive certain empirical regularities, such as the Green Card effect or occurrence of zero nominal raises. Our third step is to see if there is evidence that the salary rules have any real effects.
Data
The data are personnel records for over 50,000 employees of a large U.S. corporation from 1989-1993. The identity of the firm and certain variables must be kept confidential or disguised. The firm was in several related businesses, and vertically integrated. It was based in the Midwest, but with employees in all regions of the U.S. A small percentage of employees worked in other countries, but virtually none moved between these regions and the U.S. During this period the firm's industry had some consolidation. Our firm completed two acquisitions just before the sample period. It announced a "major restructuring" in the early 1990s, but there was little evidence of it in the data, and the firm had used little of the restructuring reserve set aside in the balance sheet by the end of the period.
The dataset includes information on each employee's demographics (age, education, gender, race, marital status, and disability status), compensation, and performance. We have the hiring date, and so company tenure. There are codes for job and workgroup (business, organization, and unit). Compensation variables include salary, salary range and pay plan, bonus eligibility, and bonuses awarded. 3 Almost all salaried employees were paid through one of three pay plans, Grade, Hay, or PAQ, described below. Salary data were deflated using the monthly Consumer Price Index.
The data provide a record for every personnel change for every employee, including the date and reason for the change. For example, for each change in a job, the personnel department would categorize the change as a promotion, demotion, lateral transfer or exit. 4 Personnel actions occurred throughout the year. However, many actions (especially compensation and performance ratings) clustered around year-ends. Thus, we restructured the data into year-end "snapshots" for each employee, with the employee's current status (e.g., job title, codes, salary range), and information on some events that occurred over the past year (e.g., bonuses, promotions).
A few variables required special treatment. For example, if an employee earned more than one type of bonus (or, on rare occasions, two or more of the same type), these were summed to give the total bonus. Performance ratings were most complicated to convert to year-end values. We wanted to associate ratings with the job and salary in which they were earned. However, job and salary changes did not always happen at year-end. Thus, an employee might have performance ratings during a calendar year associated with the job title at prior year-end. Consider 3 We ignored small bonuses for such as "Stop Smoking" bonuses, to focus on performance bonuses.
an employee given a rating early in the year, a promotion later in the year, and a new rating early the next year (before any job changes that year). Presumably, the employee's earlier rating reflects performance in the prior job, and was part of the reason for the promotion. The latter rating reflects performance in the new job, if given before any subsequent job changes in the latter year.
To associate performance ratings with the job and salary level in which they were earned, in this example, the year-end snapshot would include next year's rating. Thus, two performance ratings might be relevant for the year-end snapshot. The first is any rating earned this year, but after any change to the year-end job and/or salary level (otherwise the rating would be associated with the prior year). The second is any rating earned next year, prior to any job or salary changes. In the small number of cases where the employee had both of these ratings, they were averaged.
Formal Salary Rules
The firm had the kind of formal salary system used by almost all medium to large firms, and described in other studies and compensation textbooks (Belcher & Atkinson 1987; Wallace & Fay 1988; Henderson 1989; Murphy 1991) . Though the firm had three nominally different salary systems, Hay, Grade, and PAQ, in practice they were very similar in design. Roughly speaking, Hay and Grade covered white-collar professional or managerial jobs, while PAQ covered clerical or technical office jobs (blue collar employees are ignored, as they were paid on an hourly basis). Over the sample period, the firm gradually shifted from the Hay to the Grade system, to internalize and simplify compensation administration (there were fewer Grade than Hay ranges). Thus we lump Hay and Grade positions together in the empirical analyses.
The first step in pay administration was to determine the "target" salary level for each job: the salary for someone of typical skill and performance in that or a similar job. Each job was assigned a number of points measuring various aspects of the job that the labor market is sup-posed to compensate. Hay jobs were assigned "Hay Points" for "Problem Solving," "Know How," and "Accountability" required in performing the job, by Hay Associates, a large compensation consulting firm. Grade jobs were assigned similar points through internal review by the HR department. PAQ jobs were assigned points using the Position Analysis Questionnaire, an assessment survey commonly used for blue-collar jobs (Belcher & Atkinson 1987) .
Jobs were clustered into a small number of groups (e.g., roughly a handful of Grade groups each year). Next, the base and price of a job point were determined for each group (based on market pay data supplied by Hay Associates, or within-firm historical pay data for Grade and PAQ jobs). These, along with the job's total points, determined the midpoint of the salary range.
For example, for job i in cluster g,
where α g = base and β g = price of a point for all jobs in group g. The next step was to set ranges around the midpoints (minimum and maximum an employee was allowed to earn). In Hay and
Grade jobs, the range was always 40% of the midpoint, from 80% to 120% around the midpoint.
In PAQ jobs, salary ranges varied from a low of about 29.4% up to about 40.3% of the midpoint.
Within job groups, ranges tended to move in lockstep over time (often exactly so, or with small variation in job points). Thus, the salary structure was relatively rigid across grades within broad groups; ranges generally were not adjusted separately.
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As in most firms (Murphy 1991; BGH 1994a) , raises were determined largely as a function of the employee's location in the salary range and performance rating. Supervisors were 5 The small number of changes in salary ranges relative to each other were usually cases where the range was changed from hourly to annual salary, or vice versa. These appear to be changes in salary administration for those jobs. In other cases, ranges tend to retain their pay level relative to other ranges from year to year. This is as for the U.S. government's General Scale (GS) salary plan, in which all salary ranges are given the same percentage raise each year.
given little discretion over the raise, other than through the rating. All else equal, employees at the lower end of the range were given larger raises, while employees at the higher end were given smaller raises. This salary compression within ranges is what BGH (1994a) termed the "Green Card effect." We will return to this effect below.
The HR department also set rules for annual bonuses. Jobs differed in whether or not employees in those jobs had access to various bonus pools. Grade/Hay employees had "Full," "Partial" or no eligibility for bonuses related to corporate or division performance. Those with "Full" eligibility (roughly speaking, those in higher hierarchical levels) were eligible for the largest bonuses. All Hay/Grade and PAQ jobs had access to smaller bonus pools that were unrelated to corporate or division performance. Supervisors had little or no ability to vary bonuses except through performance ratings.
It is worth considering the constraints put on supervisors in this (very typical) system. A supervisor probably had some say over where in the salary range a new hire came in. The boss also determined the employee's rating, and presumably had input into the employee's promotion prospects. However, the supervisor had no direct control over the raise or bonus, or the overall raise or bonus pool for the business unit. Since there were only a few performance-rating categories, the supervisor had a small number of instruments by which to vary pay among subordinates in any given year. Moreover, the boss's ability to attract and retain good employees was limited by range minimums and especially maximums. 6 In theory, if each employee were assigned to a different job category, there would be great flexibility and salary ranges would not really limit compensation. In practice, the firm decreased the number of ranges over time and, salary grades largely moved together. Thus supervisors had little ability to affect compensation of new hires or subordinates through assignment to salary range.
Salary Range Dynamics
We now turn to an empirical description of the dynamics of the salary system. In what follows, an important variable will be the employee's "Location in Range" [LR] :
If the range is binding, the LR can go from 0 to 100; it is the employee's location in the range as a percentage of the distance from minimum to maximum. Because ranges vary in width, and PAQ ranges vary in width as percent of midpoint, this measure is comparable across different pay plans and employees. Table 2 shows the distribution of employees within ranges, by pay plan, job tenure, and midpoint (a crude measure of the employee's hierarchical level). In each row, the distribution of employees across values of LR is presented (so these percentages sum to 100% for each row).
For example, the mean LR is usually in the high 30s to low 40s, so the average employee is a little below the midpoint.
About 5% of those with low job tenure have a salary below the minimum, while about 4% with high job tenure have a salary above the maximum. Curious about this, we asked an HR employee if the firm "bends the rules" in some cases, so that salary ranges are not in fact binding. This employee said that they are inviolate. Thus, these are presumably cases where pay and range changes are not perfectly synchronized. Consider an employee just hired at the low end of the range. Soon after being hired, the salary range is given an adjustment (for inflation, etc.). If the employee's salary is not changed until the next year, it is possible that for a short period the salary is outside the range -though it was not when the salary was set. Now consider an employee near the top of the range undergoing an annual salary review. The boss or HR department may realize that the range is about to be adjusted, so the employee may be given a raise that is technically above the maximum for a short period. Similarly, the employee's salary or range information might not be updated immediately in the personnel records, so that our data make it appear that the employee is above the range when he or she is not.
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Viewing the cases where pay is greater than the maximum as temporary coding errors, and combining these observations with those where the LR ≥ 90, gives an idea of how many employees are in danger of "topping out" in the range. Overall, about 5% are close to the top of the range, with greater percentages among those with high job tenure, and who are in the lowest and highest paying ranges. Thus, for some employees the salary constraints are near binding. Below we examine whether the constraints appear to affect personnel outcomes. Table 3 examines the dynamics behind Table 2 : where and why do employees enter and exit ranges? Before turning to the main findings, note that a small number of employees moved "off scale;" i.e., were not assigned to a range. Employees were more likely to move off scale if they were already below or above the salary range, but otherwise there was no relationship between LR and going off scale next period. One possible way to avoid constraints of a formal salary system is to remove employees from the system altogether. Did this occur in our sample?
Once more, we asked a contact in the firm's HR department if it was possible to move an employee off scale to get around the salary constraints, and she indicated that it was not. She suggested that some off scale employees were new hires that were allowed to earn unusually high pay temporarily, because they earned more in their previous firm. These employees would be given less than normal raises over the next year or so in order to bring them in line with the firm's salary ranges. Of those off scale, over 97% were in their first year in their current job. This suggests that off scale employees were new hires, or cases where the personnel records had not yet been updated with salary range information. Thus, the inability to move employees off scale is strong evidence that the firm did stick to the salary rules.
The top panel of Table 3 focuses on entry into ranges. Each row represents an entry source: what happened to the employee this period (stayed in job, demoted, laterally transferred, promoted, or hired). For example, the 25.2 in the first column means that 25.2% of all persons promoted were given a salary near the bottom of the range for their new job. Rows in the top panel sum to 100%. Table 3 shows that those demoted are more likely to be moved into higher LRs in their new salary ranges; those promoted or hired are more likely to be brought into lower regions, and lateral transfers are somewhere in the middle (and similar to stayers). These findings make some sense. New hires and those promoted are comparable, since they are substitutes in filling available positions. New hires have less firm-specific human capital than promotes, but may have more general human capital or higher innate ability, or the firm would not consider them adequate substitutes for internal candidates. Lateral transfers are probably cases where the employee was assigned to the wrong job, but has reasonably good performance or ability. Instead of giving a demotion, or having the employee stall in the current job, the firm transfers the employee.
Given the existing skills and a better job match, it may make sense to transfer the employee into the middle of the new salary range.
The fact that about 20% of demotees are brought into the upper end of their new ranges is interesting. Some demotions may be cases where the employee was promoted too far, but would be a good performer in the lower level job. The firm may want to retain the demoted employee (Bernhardt 1995) . It might also be consistent with the idea that the firm is reluctant to cut nomi-nal salary (Table 6 below), and spreads changes in salary gradually over time (as it apparently does for some off scale new hires).
The bottom panel of Table 3 focuses on types of movement from locations in the range; thus each column sums to 100%. The pattern of exits across LRs is fairly constant, with some decline at higher LRs. This suggests that those who have been in the range longer (higher LRs)
are more likely to have a good job match, or more job or firm specific human capital. Nothing in Table 3 suggests that those topping out in the range are more likely to leave; we return to this question below.
Demotions and lateral transfers occur from all parts of the range. The same is true for promotions, but they occur more often from the bottom of the range, or from above the range (these probably reflect cases where the promotion was coded later than the associated raise) (Q 7 ).
Employees in the low end of the range are most likely to have entered the range recently. Thus, the fact that promotion rates are highest for those low in the range suggests that promotions are given rapidly in this firm.
Rapid promotions are not the same as a "fast track," but are consistent with one. 8 Suppose those promoted quickly from the bottom of the range are fast learners, and tend to be promoted faster at the next stage as well. Meanwhile, some employees who are slow learners eventually accumulate sufficient skills to earn promotion, more slowly and from higher LRs. This would generate a fast track effect (BGH 1994a).
8 A fast track usually refers to the phenomenon whereby employees who are promoted quickly at one stage of the hierarchy are more likely to get promoted again, and tend to be promoted more quickly, at the next stage. For example, BGH (1994a) found evidence of such an effect in the firm they studied. They also found what they termed "fast track exits," in which those promoted quickly at one level were more likely to exit the firm (as well as more likely to be promoted again).
With only 5 years of data, it is difficult to look for fast track effects. We do have information on job tenure for employees in the first year of the data, but only observe job transitions for 4 years, truncating job tenure at second promotion at 3 years. Table 4 shows promotion, lateral transfer and exit rates in the first three years after observed promotions. The data suggest that there is a fast track effect (Q 1 ). Those promoted quickly the first time are more likely to be promoted again within three years; second promotion rates decline with years to first promotion.
Lateral transfers are included to investigate whether fast promotions are more likely to be mistakes corrected by transfer. There is no evidence that this is the case, as transfer rates do not decline with tenure after promotion. Exits are included to investigate whether there is a fast track exit effect, whereby those promoted quickly are more likely to leave the firm. BGH (1994a) found this effect, and interpreted it as indicating that fast promotes are more likely to have too high ability to stay with the firm. The outside market observes the fast promotion, market value increases, and some exit. Exit rates do tend to decline with years at job on first promotion, so there is evidence of a fast track exit effect in this firm as well. Table 5 returns to the question of salary range dynamics first considered in Table 3 , but looking at promotions as in Table 4 . Consistent with Table 3 and earlier studies, employees earn promotions from all parts of salary ranges, but promotions are more likely to come from the lower end of the range (Q 7 ). Most new promotes end up in the bottom half of the new salary range; about 70% have an LR no greater than 30, and almost all have an LR no greater than 60.
Thus, an employee's location in range is likely to fall on promotion. This effect is especially strong for those promoted from the high end of their previous range. One implication of this (the last column) is that the average raise on promotion is smaller than the average difference in mid-point of the salary ranges before and after promotion (Q 5 ). Note that this reinforces the regression to the midpoint caused by the Green Card effect (see Table 7 ).
Are Formal Salary Systems a Veil?
Having described formal salary policies and movement within and between salary ranges, we now look for evidence on whether or not the rules have observable effects on compensation and career dynamics.
A common observation is that firms are reluctant to give negative nominal raises; several studies have shown that this is reflected in truncation and a spike in the distribution of nominal salary increases at zero (BGH 1994b; Card & Hyslop 1997; McLaughlin 2000) . This issue is investigated in Table 6 .
Nominal salary cuts are very rare; these are mostly demotions (Q 2 ). If the firm is reluctant to cut nominal salary, the best it can do in cases where salary is thought to be too high is to give a zero nominal raise. Rows 3-4 show the prevalence of zero nominal raises, both overall and conditional on receiving a zero nominal raise the prior year. As in other studies, there is a spike in nominal raises at zero. Zero nominal raises are earned at all parts of the range. Presumably, employees with low performance ratings receive these. Another important cause of zero nominal raises, however, is the constraint of the salary range maximum: they are substantially more likely (for at least two years in a row) if an employee is at or near the top of the range. In fact, the majority of zero nominal raises are caused by the constraint of the salary range maximum.
The second panel of Table 6 shows the incidence of zero bonuses, negative real raises, and negative real increases in total compensation (raise plus bonus). Negative real raises are much more prevalent near the top of the range. For example, roughly one fourth of employees near the top of the range earn negative real increases in a given year. However, such employees are also more likely to earn bonuses. This might be caused by supervisors giving bonuses as a substitute when they are unable to give raises because of salary constraints. If so, this does not fully compensate for the salary constraints: those at the top of the range are much more likely to earn negative total increases in pay than those at lower range locations. Supervisors were also allowed to use a plus and minus with these categories. In practice, a minority of the supervisors used this refinement. Therefore, we combined all pluses and minuses into the categories. We did not use the category of "Too New to Evaluate" in our analyses that required performance evaluations. Since these all are people in their first year on the job, they are not included in other analyses that require persons to stay in one job from one year to the next.
about each, the rating could be based on any relative weighting of the three desired. For example, where much is already known about innate ability (say, employees with high tenure), ratings might be used more to reflect current effort, to elicit incentives. For workers with low tenure, ratings might be used more for sorting purposes, or to elicit investments in human capital. These issues are beyond the scope of the paper. However, the results in Table 7 suggest that all of these effects may matter. Since bonuses are tied to better ratings (at least for white collar workers), it seems plausible that this is to elicit effort incentives. Furthermore, if bonuses are used to elicit incentives, there seems little reason to use raises for the same purpose. Some theories suggest that salaries are more likely to track an employee's outside market value (Bernhardt 1995; Gibbons & Waldman 1999 , which would be based on innate ability and human capital. Therefore, the tying of raises to ratings in this firm suggests that performance ratings are also indicators of the employee's ability and skills, at least to some extent. Table 7 also includes controls for tenure in the current job. Prior work found that as job tenure rose, raises and promotion rates fell (BGH 1994b) . This is sometimes associated with the "Peter Principle" (Peter & Hull 1969; Gibbs 1995; Lazear forthcoming) , whereby employees are promoted to their level of incompetence. Table 7 indicates that raises and bonuses do fall with tenure, even after controlling for ratings and LR (Q 10 ). However, the effect is small and of little economic significance. Much of the effect of tenure on raises and bonuses is already captured in the performance rating and current LR. Those with higher tenure (passed over more times for promotion) are more likely to get worse performance ratings but be higher in the range.
The regressions in Table 7 include controls for whether the employee is in the bottom, third quarter (above the midpoint), upper quarter of the range up to LR < 90, or close to the top (LR ≥ 90). 10 As expected, raises decline with LR (Q 8 ). Moreover, the binding constraint can be seen in the large negative coefficients for the dummies indicating employees who at the top of the range (also see Table 6 ). There is regression of salary to the midpoint. The coefficients suggest that the only way for stayers in any of the pay plans to continue to earn real salary increases, if they are at or above the midpoint, is to keep earning Distinguished performance ratings. Distinguished ratings are very rare, so the ability of stayers to increase their salary is quite limited.
One implication of this is that the chief means of increasing earnings over the long run in this firm is by earning promotions (Lazear 1992; BGH 1994b) .
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This regression of pay within ranges, driven by the salary plan design, could potentially impose costs on the firm. Since it is difficult to get to the higher end of the range without earning
Distinguished ratings, those near the top must have been good performers. Some will be unlikely to earn promotion, since they have already been passed over several times. They may also find that it is difficult to raise salary further, which might reduce incentives or cause them to exit the firm. Whether or not this is costly to the firm depends on whether the firm is earning rents on such employees, or how we think about the Peter Principle. If performance ratings measure "innate ability" or accumulated human capital (especially job or firm specific human capital) then it is likely that the firm is earning some rents on them relative to other employees in the same range. If performance ratings measure the employee's current performance, they may imply a strong match with the current job, but not high ability or human capital. In this case it is less 10 Various specifications for LR yield similar conclusions.
11 Even if total pay (salary plus bonus) is considered, there is regression of pay within ranges in both Grade/Hay and PAQ salary systems. In both total dollars and percentage increase, real increases in total pay fall with the employee's location in range. For example, in Grade/Hay jobs, employees at the bottom of the range experience an average increase in real total pay of about $4,000 (9.6%) per year, while those at the top of the range experience an average increase of about $2,300 (2.6%).
likely that the firm is earning rents on the employee. Without a better understanding of what performance ratings measure for different classes of employees, or better measures of employee ability or human capital, it is difficult to resolve this question. However, it is possible to see if we can infer that the firm is facing some costs of this sort in two ways: first, by looking for evidence that the firm tries to work around such problematic cases; and second, by looking for evidence that such cases cause reductions in performance or exits from the firm.
First consider whether the firm employs "work arounds" to the salary constraints faced by employees near the top of the range. There are several ways this could be done. One is to simply bend the rules. From the description and evidence above, this does not appear to be the case. Another possibility is to build weaker regression of pay into salary ranges with more "valuable" employees. For example, assume that employees who are higher in the firm's hierarchy would be more costly to lose. We might expect that in establishing the salary raise matrix (as a function of rating and LR), the HR department would build in weaker salary regression for employees in such high level jobs. If so, then the coefficients on LR ≥ 90 in salary regressions in Table 7 would be smaller for such employees. To look for this effect, Table 7 proxies for high level Grade/Hay employees by including controls for the midpoint, under the presumption that higher midpoints represent higher-level jobs. This is interacted with the dummy indicating if the employee is right near the top of the range. If the firm is concerned about problems caused by high-level employees "topping out" in the salary range, then it should penalize such employees less in their raise, so the interaction term should have a positive sign. In fact, the coefficient is positive, but it is statistically and economically insignificant. Table 7 examines a slightly different question for PAQ employees, who do not vary much in salary midpoint. PAQ ranges varied in width as percent of the midpoint. Narrower ranges might cause more employees to top out in their range. If the firm were concerned about costs induced by this, we would expect that it would build weaker Green Card effects into narrower ranges. Thus, the PAQ raise regression in Table 7 controls for the width of the range (as percent of the midpoint), and interacts this with the dummy indicating if the employee is near the top of the range. In this case, the coefficient is predicted to have a negative sign. However, as with Grade/Hay employees, the coefficient is statistically and economically insignificant. Thus, it does not appear that the firm tries to mitigate the potential costs of topping out in salary by reducing the Green Card effect where the costs might be highest (higher level employees or narrower salary ranges).
A third way to work around salary constraints might be through bonuses (Baker 1992) .
Giving larger bonuses to those ineligible for raises might improve incentives and retention. If employees at the top of the range were good performers, we might expect larger bonuses to substitute for lower raises. Table 7 shows that this does happen for Grade/Hay, but not PAQ, employees: in the Grade/Hay pay plans, the higher one's LR, the higher one's bonus. Moreover, the bonus is particularly large for employees who are in danger of topping out in salary. In contrast, bonuses do not vary with the width of the salary range. Thus, unlike prior research (Gibbs 1995) , there is some evidence of bonus substitution for white-collar employees in this firm. There is no evidence of bonus substitution for PAQ employees. Note, however, that Table 6 indicates that bonuses do not fully compensate for constrained raises for employees at the top of the range.
Do employees who top out in salary ranges have reduced incentives? We observe subjective performance ratings (and promotions, analyzed in Table 9 ) instead of actual performance. As discussed above, it is unclear whether subjective ratings reflect the employee's current performance or long-term potential. There might be behavioral effects as well. If the supervisor knows that the salary system constrains the employee's ability to earn raises, he or she might be less concerned with giving a high rating since it would have little practical effect. On the other hand, the supervisor might be tempted to give the employee a better rating, to compensate for the fact that the employee's raise will be lowered because of an already high salary. 12 For these reasons, performance ratings are difficult to interpret. In Table 8 we present analyses of ratings so that the reader can get a sense for how they vary with variables of interest.
Like other studies, we find that most employees earn middle ratings (Good or Outstanding). 13 Only about two percent received ratings above Outstanding or Good. Therefore, in Table 8 ratings are collapsed into two categories, Good + or below, and Outstanding -or above.
The table presents logits predicting whether or not the employee earns a rating in the Outstanding -or above group. Employees who are higher in the range are more likely to earn high ratings (Q 9 ). Ratings do not tend to be lower if the employee is at the top of the range. If anything they are more likely to be in the top group. The interactions, between narrow (PAQ) or high midpoint (Grade/Hay), and being at the top of the range, suggest that topping out in salary has no effect on ratings. If weak salary incentives are not associated with poorer performance evaluations, perhaps employees still have adequate promotion incentives. The table may also reflect that supervisors are inclined to give high ratings to employees at the top of the range to mitigate the Green Card effect. Each column presents a multinomial logit predicting whether the employee will stay in the cur-12 One important determinant of how this plays out in practice must surely be whether or not the supervisor pays a price for giving larger raises to employees. Some supervisors have employee salaries and bonuses taken out of their unit's budget, while others do not. We do not know what the typical practice was at this firm. The firm did not have forced curves or other constraints on rating distributions. rent job (the base case), or be laterally transferred, promoted, or exit (demotions were too rare to include). If topping out in salary is costly, the firm may laterally transfer some near the top of the range into job ladders with better promotion prospects, to avoid losing them. Similarly, it might be more inclined to promote some employees near the maximum (either in preference to others, or by creating new positions). If the firm does not take these actions, salary constraints might frustrate talented employees at the top of the range, who might quit.
The first statistic in each column is the estimated coefficient. A coefficient of zero means that this variable has no estimated impact on the probability the employee will stay in the job, compared to a transition of this type. A negative coefficient means that increases in this variable are associated with a decreased relative probability of transition; a positive coefficient has the opposite interpretation. The second statistic (in parentheses) is the relative risk ratio. This is the ratio of the probability of that outcome when the variable increases by 1 unit, to the probability when the variable is not increased. This is a natural metric for marginal effects in this table, Instead, they may be transferred to another job (the coefficient is marginally significant), which probably allows more upward mobility.
Finally, Table 9 shows little evidence that the firm alters job transition rates for employees who are near the top of the range in higher level (midpoint) Grade/Hay jobs. 14 Promotion is slightly less likely as salary grade increases, but otherwise there appear to be no effects. Lateral transfers are no more probable. This provides no evidence of the firm working around salary constraints by offering lateral transfers. Interestingly, employees who are topping out in salary are not more likely to quit. One interpretation is that these employees have found a good job or firm match compared to their alternatives, so that their propensity to exit does not fall despite lack of further salary growth or promotion opportunities. This suggests that the costs of this sort imposed by the salary rules may not be substantial at this firm.
Additional Findings
Above, we have provided evidence related to 7 of Gibbons' 10 core questions listed in Table 1 . For completeness, here we provide evidence on the remaining three questions. Our panel is too short to give them detailed analysis, but we can shed some light on how our findings square with prior work.
One important question is whether wage increases forecast promotions. BGH (1994b) found that those who earn higher annualized raises are more likely to be promoted, and are promoted faster. Unfortunately, for those we know are new to a job, we observe at most two years of raises and a subsequent year's job transition. However, other findings strongly suggest that the phenomenon would occur in this firm (Q 6 ). Promotions tend to happen quickly, and often from the low end of the range. Those at the low end of the range earn larger raises, all else equal.
Therefore, it seems likely that fast promotes would experience fast wage growth before promo-
tion. An interesting extension is the following: after adjusting for the Green Card effect, would annualized raises in the current job still have a negative correlation with probability of eventual promotion, and a positive correlation with years to promotion? It may be that the effect BGH found was driven by how raises are awarded as a function of the employee's LR, and how LR is related to years in the current job (this is similar to our findings on the effect of job tenure on raises in Table 7 ).
A second unaddressed question is whether or not an employee's real raises exhibit serial correlation, after controlling for observed individual characteristics (BGH 1994b; Farber & Gibbons 1996) . While most learning models suggest that salary should be serially uncorrelated, BGH found that raises were serially correlated after controlling for education, age, experience, and job level. This was interpreted as suggesting heterogeneity across employees in rates of human capital acquisition. 15 Table 10 presents serial correlations of raise residuals over the two four-year periods that we do observe. We ran real raise regressions for stayers, including controls for a large set of observable characteristics: education, gender, age, tenure in company and current job, job function, salary level (or range midpoint), performance rating, and year. 16 Serial correlations of residuals from these regressions are presented in the "Unadjusted" rows of Table 10 .
Consistent with BGH, raise residuals are serially correlated with raise residuals the year before, 15 Another possibility is heterogeneity in learning rates across jobs, not employees (Munasinghe 2000) . 16 Regressions were also run for all employees controlling for promotions and lateral transfers, with similar results.
though not two years back (Q 3 ). However, Grade/Hay serial correlations are negative rather than positive, which is inconsistent with an interpretation based on differences in rates of human capital accumulation.
One possible explanation for negative serial correlation is "measurement error" in wage levels. Since we are using actual personnel records, there is little or no recording error in the data. However, since wage changes occur episodically (usually once per year) and are based at least in part on administrative rules, they may not perfectly reflect the wage desired by the firm at a given point in time. Dohmen (2003) offers several other potential explanations for serial correlation in raises. First, zero nominal increases for those at the top of the range would induce some correlation. Ignoring such cases reduces but does not eliminate the serial correlation, as in BGH (1994b). Second, performance ratings are correlated for an individual. Third, in his data, firm wage growth can vary across wage scales; there is almost none of that in our firm.
It is also possible that such serial correlations might be caused by the salary rules, through the Green Card effect. Consider employees who are low in the range. All else equal, they tend to earn larger raises. Unless this puts them at or above the midpoint, the same should be true next year. This would induce positive serial correlation in raises. Similar logic should apply for those near the top of the range. Of course, employees who are near the midpoint might have a negative serial correlation, as they bounce around the midpoint over time. The overall serial correlation would depend on the distribution of employees within the range. To check for this, we reran the regressions including controls for LR (using the salary range partition from Table 2 ), and recomputed serial correlations for these residuals. These are presented in the "Adjusted" rows of Table 10 . Adding controls for LR causes the serial correlations to disappear for Grade/Hay employees, but has little effect for PAQ employees. Thus, serial correlation in raises is partly caused by the salary system.
A final question is whether there is a cohort effect on employee salary levels. Beaudry and DiNardo (1991) found that the lowest level of unemployment since hiring is a significant determinant of salary. Similarly, BGH (1994b) found that a cohort dummy significantly affects salary over time, after controlling for year and tenure, though they could not assess economic significance because of the identification problem between cohort, year, and tenure. Both findings suggest an internal labor market, whereby an employee's pay is partially shielded from current labor market conditions. However, Eriksson and Werwatz (2003) find mixed evidence on cohort effects in their sample of 222 Danish firms. Table 11 presents similar findings for the firm studied here. The dataset includes the original hire date, so each employee's cohort can be calculated (a small percentage of employees hired before 1966 were ignored). Regressions were run predicting the employee's real salary as a function of education, age, gender, race, year, and tenure. These were compared against similar regressions that included cohort dummies (once again inferences about the magnitude of coefficients are impossible because of the identification problem). The table presents F-statistics assessing the added statistical power of including controls for cohorts. Both F-statistics are highly significant, suggesting that in this firm as well, there is a persistent effect of the employee's cohort on salary (Q 4 ).
Conclusions
The pay policies of the firm studied in this paper closely match salary plans used by most large firms, and described in most compensation textbooks. The firm appears to stick strictly to the rules and constraints of the system. Unlike economic models where principals have wide latitude over salaries, raises, and bonuses, supervisors have little discretion except perhaps at hiring or promotion, and in giving performance ratings (across a small number of subjective categories). They have little control over salary levels as well, after hiring, because of regression of pay within salary ranges. Furthermore, they have limited ability to use bonuses to work around salary constraints and fine tune incentives. The widespread use of bureaucratic pay systems suggests that they must have benefits.
Formal, centralized policies may reduce administrative costs. They may also increase perceptions of equity or fairness. Similarly, limits on supervisor discretion can reduce influence costs (Milgrom 1988; Milgrom & Roberts 1988) , and favoritism (Prendergast 1993; Prendergast & Topel 1996) .
We find confirmation for the results of the prior literature on almost all of the questions cited by Gibbons (1997) . The consistency of findings on these basic questions across this and other studies provides a foundation for theoretical work that cannot be ignored.
It is worthwhile to think about what wage and career dynamics are suggested by the evidence here and in related empirical work. Regression of pay within ranges or levels suggests that firms and the labor market learn about employee abilities over time, and sort them accordingly.
Those with low job tenure have higher raises and are more likely to be promoted, suggesting higher ability. Those who have been passed over are revealed to have lower ability. Heterogene-ity in ability (and possibly in human capital acquisition rates across individuals or jobs; it is difficult to disentangle them) leads to systematic differences in wage growth, promotion rates, and fast tracking. It also may lead to serial correlation in salary changes, even after controlling for all observables. Salary falls for those high in the salary range, not only relative to others lower in the same range, but also often in real terms, suggesting that the employee's outside market value also plays a role.
There is some disagreement in the literature about whether or not "wages are attached to jobs." Our evidence suggests that they both are, and are not, in some sense. There is important dispersion in salary among those in the same job or range (or hierarchical level, in other studies).
There are also important salary dynamics within these classifications. In this sense, wages are not attached to jobs. However, regression of pay within ranges implies that in the long run, wages are largely attached to grades, so that promotions are essential to long-term salary growth.
Wage and career dynamics are driven by the interaction between two forces: underlying economic factors that are the focus of traditional labor economics (acquisition of human capital;
sorting; incentives; and labor market pressures), and firm personnel policies. If these conflict, we would expect to see problems arise (e.g., high turnover), or redesign of the policies. The firm studied here, like most large firms, uses very bureaucratic pay policies. Yet aside from downward nominal salary rigidity we find little evidence that the formal rules impose important costs on the firm. We also find little evidence, other than incomplete substitution of bonuses for raises at the top of the salary range, that the firm employs workarounds when the system is most constraining on personnel management. Instead the firm largely sticks to the rules. A plausible interpretation is that the salary system evolved to largely mirror the wage and career dynamics that underlie it, and has thus survived, though it is impossible to say so for certain. [ Table 6 ] Q3.
Likely sometimes < 0 [Table 10 ] Q4.
[ Table 11 ] Q5.
[ Table 5 [ Tables 7,8 ] Q10.
[ Table 7 ] Q10. Is the effect of seniority on wages independent of the presence of controls for performance evaluations?
Denotes that the paper provides evidence consistent with stylized facts on this question. All Note: Shows the distribution of various types of raises for employees staying in current position, by location in range. Rows 1-3 sum to 100% within columns. Table 9 .
Job Transitions
Job transition multilogits (base case = employee stays in position next year). Numbers in parentheses are relative risk ratios indicating the change in probability going from the base state to that variable's state. ***=significant at 1%; **=at 5%; *=10%. Controls were included for race, gender, and year. Note: Serial correlations of residuals from regressions predicting % real raises, for the same employee over 4 adjacent years (3 raises). "Unadjusted" regressions control for education, gender, age, tenure, job function, job tenure, salary, performance rating, and year. "Adjusted" regressions control for all of those plus the employee's location in the salary range. Grade / Hay PAQ Year Note: ***=significant at 1%; **=significant at 5%; *=significant at 10%. All regressions include controls for entry cohort, education, age, age squared, gender, and race. 
PAQ Grade / Hay

